GOD, TIME AND CREATION
AN ESSAY IN METAPHYSICS

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Allein Metaphysik führt uns in den dialektischen Versuchen der reinen Vernunft ..
auf Grenzen; und die transscendentalen Ideen .. dienen dazu .. solche zu bestimmen.

Wenn wir mit dem Verbot, alle transscendenten Urteile der reinen Vernunft zu vermeiden,
das damit dem Anschein nach streitende Gebot bis zu Begriffen, die ausserhalb dem Felde
des immanenten (empirischen) Gebrauchs liegen, hinauszugehen, verknüpfen - [sic(k)] - :
so werden wir inne, dass beide zusammen bestehen können, aber nur gerade
auf der Grenze alles erlaubten Vernunftgebrauchs.

Wir halten uns aber auf diese Grenze, wenn wir unser Urteil bloss auf das
Verhältnis einschränken, welches die Welt zu einem Wesen haben mag, dessen Begriff
selbst ausser aller Erkennsnis liegt, deren wir innerhalb der Welt fähig sind.

Denn alsdann eignen wir dem höchsten Wesen keine von den Eigenschaften
an sich selbst zu, durch die wir uns Gegenstände der Erfahrung denken,
und vermeiden dadurch den dogmatischen Anthropomorphismus;
wir legen sie aber dennoch dem Verhältnis desselben zur Welt bei
und erlauben uns einen symbolischen Anthropomorphismus, der
in der Tat nur die Sprache und nicht das Objekt selbst angeht.

So kann uns nichts hindern, von diesem Wesen eine Kausalität durch Vernunft
in Ansehung der Welt zu prädizieren und so zum Theismus überzuschreiten.

Der unseren schwachen Begriffen angemessene Ausdruck wird sein,
das wir uns die Welt so denken, als ob sie von einer höchsten Vernunft
ihrem Dasein und innere Bestimmung nach abstamme.

Immanuel Kant
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik
die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können
1783 - III, §§57-8

1. FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM

According to Kierkegaard, the great Danish philosopher, proofs for God are either superfluous, or inconsistent. For either there is a God, or there is no God: *tertium non datur* - but if God is, all proof is superfluous, and if He is not, no proof can possibly be consistent! Hence the few hopeful minds engaged in proving God are fools who should not hope for fame; rather than wasting their time by yielding to vain speculation they should concern themselves with the basic facts of existence in a serious struggle for authenticity. Kierkegaard's disdain of speculation was only matched by his disregard of science, and he readily admitted his only interest to be the Augustinian 'God and the soul'. He nevertheless conceded that a proof for God might be reasonable and even useful if it was designed expressly to the following purpose, namely to explain the Idea of God. Unfortunately, he forgot or ignored that this, precisely, was the aim of St. Anselm: his proof was an intellectual inquiry into the foundations of faith.

The so-called *ontological* proof of Anselm - which should rather be called *dialectical* - is designed to prove that the plain proclamation of atheism is either irrelevant or inconsistent. The first point to be grasped is that it is not an affirmative syllogism, but a *reductio* directed *ad hominem*, namely against the atheist. The argument derives its very force from the vigour invested by the disbeliever in declaring his own position, so when the atheist is silenced, the theist stops arguing. The second point to be realized is that the premisses of the argument is provided by the atheist himself, partly a) by the distinction between reality and illusion entailed by his candid claim that the Idea of God does not refer to anything real although it pretends to, partly b) by the denunciation of the merely illusive, as compared to the real, implied by his enlightened refusal to worship an illusion. The third point to be grasped is that the atheistic repudiation of a divine being applies to any of kind deity, therefore also to God as confessed by the faithful believer who pronounces him to be *that than which no greater can be conceived*. This is not meant as a definition, however, but as a description; the infinite cannot be defined. The crucial question is, does the Idea thus described refer to anything real?

Anselm proceeds as follows: Anything thought of, e.g. the Idea of God, has being in thought, *esse in intellectu*; the distinction between reality and illusion is next expressed as the difference between that which has being both in thought and in itself, *esse in intellectu et in re*, and that which has being in thought only, but not in itself, *esse in intellectu solo*. For the Idea of God to refer or to be real, therefore, is to have being in itself as well as in thought, whereas for the Idea of God not to refer or to be illusive is to have being in thought only, and not in itself. The atheist then claims the Idea of God to

be an illusion, nothing but a projection of the human mind, wholly unworthy of religious worship. However, by doing so, and by including *that nature than which nothing greater can be thought*, he betrays himself to be nothing but a fool, or a numskull, entirely unworthy of intellectual respect. The core of the proof is that what can be denied can also be thought of, hence the atheist by denying the reality of the Idea of God does think of what he denies: but this shows him to think *that than which nothing greater can be thought* as *that than which something greater can be thought*, which is a flat inconsistency. Anselm then concludes one of two: either the atheist simply contradicts himself, or he does not know what he is talking about. In any case he shows himself to be a fool.

2. METAPHYSICS: SCIENTIA SUI GENERIS

The importance of Anselm's dialectical proof of God is not that it clarifies the connotation or conceptual *content* of the Idea of God, for in fact it has none: the significance of the argument is that it specifies the *function* of the Idea of God. It is impossible for us, as finite and limited natures, to grasp the infinite Godhead, but the function of the Anselmian formula is to show the path to *transcendence*. This it does by refusing to accept anything as Divine to which another is superior. In that way the proof becomes an instance of *via negativa*, not of *via affirmativa*: the Divine is determined indirectly by the denial of everything which is not Divine. Apart from the fact that it is God's *esse* which is at issue, not His *existentia*, there is no question of inferring the existence of God from "his" essence, or nature. Neither is there any question of using existence, or being, as a special kind of predicate. All this may be distinctive of the Cartesian approach, but not of the Anselmian one. These facts immunize the proof of Anselm not only to the objections of Aquinas, but also to those of Kant.

It therefore seems as if we - in spite of Kant - possess at least one sample of authentic metaphysics derived from pure reason: *atheism seduces us into absurdity*. In this way the basic *experience of existentialism* is affirmed by formal reasoning. So the only safe way to avoid God is to avoid speaking, and even thinking, of God; the faithful can argue succesfully against the atheist, but not against the agnostic. Now the agnostic will probably not want to dispute the possibility of metaphysics, and we shall therefore allow ourselves to neglect his awkward position at present. Instead we shall here defend the position that ***Metaphysics*** is a *scientia sui generis* - namely ***the science of pure transcendence*** - as extracted from the proof of Anselm. Rejecting the classical distinction between *analytical* and *synthetical* propositions, we further hold pure *logics* and *mathematics* to be practical *instruments of reason*. As mere *techniques* they need a minimal *interpretation* involving basic elements of experience whenever some *formal*

item is to be changed into a genuine *proposition*. Such a minimal interpretation suspends the distinction above in a way that renders it possible to regard the *same theoretical proposition* from one point of view as being *analytical*, and from another point of view as being *synthetical*. The ram which Kant used to break down the fortifications of classical metaphysics is thereby turned against the central pillar of his own transcendental criticism.

The word 'meta-physics' (gr.: *ta meta ta physika*) was assigned to the *First Philosophy* of Aristotle by accidence because some librarian placed these rolls on his bookshelves *after* the rolls with the *Physics* of Aristotle, but in the course of time popular etymology has transferred a deeper meaning to the term. As we shall take the word in the sense of 'that which transcends physics', we shall stick to the etymology, only trying to fill it with a new and clearer meaning. Although our new metaphysics - collected from pure reason as its source - appears to be purely theoretical, it is not wholly devoid of empirical elements; this follows from the impossibility of separating analytical and synthetical propositions. Pure transcendence being its sole object, this object is evidently superior not only to all other objects it is possible to conceive of, but also to all conceivable values. It thereby provides us with a unique standard of our assessments and judgments. Still evolving, it promises to open up new vistas towards unkown horizons. For the present, however, we shall content ourselves by pointing out how this new metaphysics deals with some traditional problems posed by the philosophy of physical science.

In which sense, then, does metaphysics *transcend* physics as the science of nature? As stated by Galileo, the aim of physics is 'to measure what can be measured and to make that measurable which cannot as yet be measured'; physics thus focusses on what is measurable, striving to reduce quality to quantity whenever possible. Now an act of measurement involves the comparison of an entry with a standard; in this way physics fulfils the rule of reason laid down by the philosophy of Plato. As stated by Plato, reason (*dianoia*) depends on proportion (*analogia*) in making an inference from three known components to a fourth which is as yet unknown (the dialectical underpinning of this rule is given in his famous parable of the line). What is infinite, however, cannot enter as the component of a definite proportion: pure *infinity*, constituted by pure *transcendence*, is therefore *incommensurable*. Now this way of reasoning enables us to embrace the idea of André Mercier: *Metaphysics is a science sui generis having the Incommensurable as its proper object.* Our only disagreement is minor and derives from the fact that I am somewhat more reluctant than he to accept that this object can be properly referred to as a "being". In line with the Platonic tradition of Christian philosophy, I prefer to speak of the *Infinite Godhead as*

transcending all Being, in the sense of being its Creator. Hence I shall distinguish between 'being' as a *noun* and 'being' as a *verb* (or *copula*); moreover, I shall explicitly renounce metaphysics interpreted as ontology (the doctrine of being).

What metaphysics can properly do is merely to "point" towards a certain direction. Although irrefutable, the "being" of a Godhead transcending the categories of reason cannot be sustained as more than a hypothesis - all reference to it is hyperbolic. This pure transcendence, nevertheless, involves a demarcation of limits to reason, limits that may not be transgressed by smartness illegitimately feigning authority. Hence the principal thesis of my paper is that a new metaphysics, conceived as an intellectual discipline investigating that which transcends both science and nature, is possible and legitimate to the purpose of evaluating the pretensions of physics and refuting the improper claims of a philosophy misinterpreting scientific results by exploiting such insights far beyond the proper limits of reason and experience. This obligation to criticism, however, does not restrain our new metaphysics from inquiring into the possible origin of time and world in a Divine Act of Creation. On the contrary: if it is at all conceivable that the universe as we know it can have originated from Divine Creation, it must be mandatory to our new metaphysics to investigate the rational implications to science of this assumption. The Idea of Divine Creation *is* meta-physical in the sense of transcending physics, and the very fact that it can be denied shows that it cannot be devoid of meaning; for the very same reason, the possibility of atheism indirectly affirms the Idea of God. Atheists seldom realize that they jeopardize their position by denying God, but in fact, the only consistent position of the infidel is agnosticism. Such agnosticism, however, is detrimental to the pursuit of science.

Before we present the consequences of the Idea of Creation to physics and cosmology we shall give some few hints regarding its consequences to metaphysics. Without implying God to be "being as such" (Aristotle), nor a very special kind of being, like "the most perfect being" (Descartes), or "the most real being" (Kant), we shall characterize "him" as: *Creator*, that is: the *Source and Origin* of everything else. In accordance with our reasoning hitherto we shall further characterize the pure *Act of Creation* as that act by which the Godhead transcends all nature or existence. Let us define the *world*, or *universe*, as 'the totality of everything existing'. It is immediately evident that a universe in which nothing happens cannot be a real universe. What happens we shall call events, and events take place in time. For this reason we take *Time* to be the basic feature of any possible, or conceivable, universe. Now, if a universe is to be a *Cosmos*, and not a mere chaos, it must display features which make it possible to discern one event from another, and the succession of events anywhere in the universe *must appear to be governed by laws*. The infinite set of possible worlds, or

universes, must therefore contain subsets of worlds of which each one is an equivalence class governed by the same set of laws, the members of a given equivalence class being discernible by their various contents. Of course *only one world is real,* this follows from its definition as a totality. There is no need to suppose the infinity of other conceivable worlds to be real, not even "virtually real": possible worlds are nothing but conceptual constructions. The actual world is temporal - not given all at once but from instant to instant, as a succession - and what successively differentiates it from all other possible worlds is that these other worlds, relative to some now, are mere unactualized futures. But how is "our" actual world realized as the only "real" one from among all possibles?

According to Plato it is impossible that something can come from nothing: we must therefore search for a *cause* to the becoming of everything which becomes. Causal relations do not relate things directly, but indirectly, by means of events; hence the concept of an event, but not that of a thing, is relevant to causal relationship. The causal relationship is distinguished by an asymmetry, entailed by the asymmetry of time, which gives rise to three questions hinting at three very different formulations of the causal principle: a) is it necessary that *every event* be regarded as the *effect* of some cause which is temporally prior? - or: b) is it necessary that *every event* be regarded as the *cause* of some effect which is temporally posterior? - or: c) both? While the first kind of necessity is tacitly presupposed by the *scientific explanation* of events, the second is tacitly presupposed by the *scientific prediction* of events. Clearly, God as *that than which nothing greater can be thought* cannot be thought to be effected by a prior cause, thus, if God be a cause "he" must be the *primary cause*. But is the concept of cause as sketched above compatible with a first cause? A first cause can be conceived in relation to a first event only, but, granted a first event, is this event to be imagined as a first cause or as a first effect? The difficulty is that our three questions implicitly assume a causal relation to be a *horizontal* relation between entries which are on a par. What we need in order to explain the relationship between God and his creation as a causal one is, by contrast, a *vertical* relation between entries which are not on a par, a relation depicting God as transcending both time and world in one act. Such a kind of causal relationship seems to be unique, and *sui generis*.

3. CREATION: THE WELL-SPRING OF TIME

Much of traditional Christian theology describes God not only as first cause, *prima causa,* but also as pure act, *actus purus*; this, e.g., is the case with Aquinas. In the famous BBC- discussion between F. Copleston and B. Russell concerning the *cosmological* proof of God, father Copleston recalled "the third way" of St. Thomas - what is at issue here is not as much the concept of cause as that of contingency:

The continued existence of a contingent universe depends entirely on its Creator. This seems to presuppose that all causal series of the universe can be conceived in their entirety as one simultaneous whole, but their temporality prevents that. However, it is still possible that the world may depend on its Creator in the sense that it is being kept in existence by God successively, i.e. from instant to instant.

The famous doctrine ***Conservatio est Creatio*** goes to the core of "the five ways" and is the essence of what has been termed "the existentialistic sway" of Thomism. The thesis of the contingency of the universe can be defended on the supposition that the world is preserved from instant to instant by God. For this to be possible it is not necessary that all causal series of the world can be conceived in their entirety as one unique simultaneous whole, and neither is it necessary that the entire world course in time can be surveyed from an initial to a terminal event. The point is that the idea of contingency can be accorded a clear and distinct meaning on the condition that the *Universe* is upheld as a ***totum simul*** from instant to instant in the sense that *Time and Life* is continuously being bestowed upon it as a creative *Flow* which emanates from the *Future*, becomes manifest in the *Present*, and expires in the *Past*.

God's Act of Creation might be a unique event buried in an inscrutable past; but it may also be interpreted in accordance with the contingency of the present as the preservation of ***nunc stans***, a standing Now, in the midst of the river of time. That a Now is standing is a *sign* of Divine Creation; the *result*, being the effect of Divine Creation as its first cause, is ***nunc fluens***, the contents that flows through the Now. But the notion of time in flow is ambiguous. What is the direction of such flow? Mediated by the present, does it point from past to future or from future to past? The relativization implied by the question is valid, and the solution is easy. Whereas the *emergence of reality* is followed by an increase of factual contents pointing from past to future, the *extinction of possibility* points in the opposite direction from future to past. Now, which sense is deeper than the other? The Biblical answer is that ***God, by creating the Future, is the Wellspring of Time, hence Time, which is Possibility and Grace, flows from Future to Past.*** I am very grateful to André Mercier for having pointed this out to me.

Thus time flows; but as we cannot ascribe a velocity to this flow we shall not follow Bergson in giving the concept of duration a fundamental status. But there is another problem: *Granted that the universe is time-in-flux, an absolute or universal time should be definable; however, this is incompatible with the standard interpretation of Einstein's relativity theory.* ***So we are faced with the fact that if God has once created - or is still creating - the universe, then our universe must be contingent in a manner which presupposes the definability of an all-embracing simultaneity, and this in blatant conflict with Einsteinian standard relativity.*** *Conversely, if Einsteinian*

standard relativity is true, then the universe cannot be contingent, which shows that the universe cannot depend on creation, hence cannot be created by God.

The upshot of all this is that, if we want to vindicate our new metaphysics, we have to face the challenge of physics as represented by Einsteinian relativity. Now the application of the General Relativity Theory *(GR)* to cosmology leads to a very general metric, the so-called Robertson-Walker Metric *(RWM)*, common to all world models structured according to the principle of cosmic isotropy. Despite the incompatibility of absolute simultaneity with the standard space-time interpretation of relativity, all *RW*-models of the universe allow of a cosmic time. ***All we need in order to demonstrate that the universe is contingent, hence that it may be preserved in existence by God, is to prove the definability of cosmic time***. To begin with we thus merely have to bring this cosmic time to the fore by insisting that the universe, if created, must conform to the principle of cosmic isotropy. Indeed, at present an *overwhelming evidence* shows this to be the case. Hence *creation is compatible* with the facts.

This is not yet a formal proof of God: the world may be contingent and not be created. But if the world is clearly contingent, the need of an explanation will be acute, and then only an agnostic who does not defend even the *ex nihilo nihil fit* may readily renounce. In this case we can claim to possess an informal proof of God. But the proof can be strengthened to necessity if the onus of proof is transferred to the atheist. The point is that he has to choose one of two: The universe, being contingent, either forms a self-preserving and self-explaining mechanism, i.e. a *perpetuum mobile*, or it does not. Now if, insisting on rationality, he does not wish to ascribe divine properties to the universe itself, it is fair to ask him to prove that it is in the least a *perpetuum mobile*. The atheist, however, will never be able to satisfy such a demand.

Lots of evidence show that the universe is not, cannot be, a *perpetuum mobile*. No closed physical system, being a part of the universe, can be a *perpetuum mobile*, and if the universe itself constitutes a closed system, it cannot be a *perpetuum mobile*. But a *perpetuum mobile* which is not a closed system is a contradiction in terms. Therefore an open universe, being no *perpetuum mobile*, is obviously a contingent one. Hence we conclude that the universe, be it open or not, cannot be a *perpetuum mobile*. But a universe which is not a *perpetuum mobile* is not self- preserving and lacks all explanation. Now the universe *is* open in at least 3 senses of this word: 1) it is open towards the past; 2) it is not wholly determined; 3) it is open towards the future. The validity of all scientific knowledge is necessarily conjectural and provisional, and what science can offer is merely to draw up possibilities in the form of world-models.

It can never be decided by final proof whether the universe had a first instant or not; the same holds for the question whether there will be a last instant or not - and the

same holds for the question as to which laws are valid in our universe, i.e. if any laws are valid in it at all. Now the universe is open towards the past in the sense that it is possible it had a first instant, and it is possible that this first instant was given to it by Divine Creation. Further, the universe is indeterministic in the sense that even if it be determined by laws how the future follows from the past, quantum physics has demonstrated the laws to be probabilistic. Finally, the universe is open towards the future in the sense that its fate depends on whether a future is given to it or not. The ultimate question, at any instant, is whether the universe is going have a future at all!

These arguments are decisive; the only conceivable objection to them seems to be that, after all, it might be impossible to define an absolute simultaneity valid for the entire universe. In that case it would not make sense to speak of a common future of the universe and the notion of contingency would not make sense either. But this objection has already been dealt with. If the universe is subject to the principle of universal isotropy, a cosmic time will be definable. Hence the only way left of jeopardizing the notion of absolute simultaneity is to assume that the universe, after all, is *not* subject to the principle of cosmic isotropy. Apart from the fact that such an hypothesis is in obvious conflict with current observation, it also amounts to the *ad hoc* introduction of a basic element of irrationality into cosmological science.

Why do physicists so often prefer to depict the universe as a *perpetuum mobile*? Why do philosophers need all sorts of absurdities in order to avoid the idea of creation? The claim of Grünbaum and others, that the standard laws of energy conservation suffice to ensure the continued temporal existence of the universe, involves a major misinterpretation of science. In fact, *conservation laws, teaching us everything about the conservation of quantities in time, have absolutely nothing to tell us concerning an eventual suspension of time.* A law of conservation is a formal guarantee that a certain quantity will neither increase nor decrease: it presupposes that there be a quantity at all! Therefore, what a conservation law states is that, *if* the universe continues to exist, *if* this present instant of time has a successor, *then* the total energy of any well-defined physical system will not deviate from its present value but remain constant.

It should further be noticed that if the law of the conservation of energy is to be tested then it will be necessary to specify the physical system by referring to its volume. The limits of a certain volume will be unspecifiable if there be no cosmic time to rely on, and if the spatial limits of the system in question are unspecifiable, the assumption of conservation threatens to degenerate into a pure tautology, a mere repetition of the *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which is indeed not a physical but much rather a metaphysical principle. This also shows that the regularly uttered qualms against the assumption of a continued creation of matter are nothing but inarticulate grumblings. What kind of argument can

eventually demonstrate that the proper volume over which the energy is to be integrated must necessarily be measured by coordinate distance, instead of by proper distance? The imputation of deficiency to the idea of continued creation is itself invalid.

We will now attempt to demonstrate the fruitfulness of our new metaphysics by showing how it makes use of arguments derived from considerations of symmetry. In the first instance it should be realized that the definability of a universal time depends on whether the universe displays some elementary properties of symmetry: a cosmic time is definable only in case the universe possesses the symmetry of cosmic isotropy. The Christian, accepting that the universe is created by *whom-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought*, will of course naturally assume the universe to be everywhere isotropic. ***A universe created by a perfect Creator will be as perfect as possible, and faith in Divine Creation naturally leads to ideas of universal symmetry and to hypotheses tending to assimilate the created universe to its Divine Creator***.

By contrast, the atheist who is eager to discard creation can only feel safe if it can be proved that the universe will never run out and needs no explanation for its origin. It therefore seems probable that atheism in general will show predilection for inventing models of the universe that suffer from all possible kinds of anomalies. History offers ample evidence that this is precisely the case: most scientists hold time to be illusory, just as they brand creationism as vain speculation, and the list of absurdities proposed in the name of science is tediously long: rotating universes, irregular universes, oscillating universes, universes with imaginary time, etc. My conclusion will be surprising only to those unfamiliar with the facts of history: there is a secret bond between the rationality of the universe and the Christian faith in God as its Creator! As Whitehead said: *Faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern (science), is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology*.

God as the incommensurable itself necessarily transcends all sorts of symmetry. Nevertheless there are very good reasons for assuming that Creation, in the sense of a progressive formal differentiation of the universe as a created manifold of things, takes place in accordance with the successive introduction and suspension of symmetries of lesser and lesser generality. The most fundamental symmetry of the universe is that which makes its structure definable in terms of a universal class of equivalent so-called fundamental particles, and this symmetry precisely correlates the very concept of structure to that of an all-embracing, universal time. ***Hence, in a very basic sense, simultaneity - and not causality - is the cement of the universe***. In fact, everything in cosmology may be said to depend on the idea of universal time.

Assuming all fundamental particles to carry observers supplied with identical clocks, i.e. clocks based on the same mechanisms and controlled by atoms of the same

type, their equivalence can be interpreted in the usual relativistic way. The condition of speaking of laws being invariant to the translation of data between different observers is that their clocks be adjusted by means of unique radar-signals distinguished by delays depending on the distances traversed, and that equivalent observers by definition assign the same velocity to such signals. Now the first, and decisive, breaking of symmetry is associated with the imposition of a layer of so-called accidental particles, particles not perfectly equivalent to those of the universal set. As shown in the *Kinematic Relativity* (***KR***) of Milne, local deviations from global symmetry lead to spontaneous accelerations which approximate the classical law of gravitation!

This fact encourages us to suggest a new program of physical science which diverges from that of Einstein by not having as its purpose to reduce time to space and gravitation to inertia but - on the contrary - to derive space from time, and to explain gravitation by inertia. This program which is inspired by Milne is at variance with all attempts to geometrize physics. Instead, it proposes to solve the basic problems of cosmology in the "kinematic" way by taking as its paradigm neither ***SR***, nor ***GR***, but Milne's ***KR*** which, as pointed out by J. Merleau-Ponty, is "a Leibnizian monadology translated into mathematics". What counts in favour of Milne is that his program (in contrast also, e.g., to that of Whitehead which is a mere "half-way house") incorporates the relationalist and conventionalist philosophy of the great mathematician and physicist Poincaré who, before Einstein, discovered the Lorentz Group and ***SR***.

The central issue, separating *the relativist tradition* culminating in *Poincaré* from *the mediumist tradition* culminating in *Lorentz*, is reducible to this basic question: Is the existence of a *universal substratum* defined by the mass-distribution of the class of all fundamental particles, granted that such a class exists, to be regarded as mere coincidence, a brute *fact* of nature, or is it the manifestation of some *law*? This question presents us with a choice between a pure *theory of strong relativity* and a *theory of weak relativity* based on the aether-hypothesis. Until the reality of an aether has been finally proven, I shall opt for the first. In another place I have shown how it is possible to develop a new tense logic allowing for the creation not only of reality but even of truth.

My general conclusion is that it is indeed possible to construct a new philosophy of time, reality, and transcendence, as a synthesis which plausibly assumes the character of a new metaphysics of *God, Time & Creation*.

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